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Abstract
Data security and personal privacy are difficult to maintain in the
Internet age. In 2012, professional networking site LinkedIn suffered a
breach, compromising the login of over 100 million accounts. The pass-
words were cracked and sold online, exposing the authentication creden-
tials millions of users. This manuscript dissects the cryptographic failures
implicated in the breach, and explores more secure methods of storing
passwords.
1 Introduction
LinkedIn is one of the largest social media and professional networking sites in
the world. With over 400 million members as of 2017[10], any data leak risks the
personal and professional information of millions of people. In 2012, LinkedIn’s
servers were breached, exposing the hashed passwords of approximately 117
million accounts over a course of several years.[15] These passwords were quickly
decoded and sold online, indicating that LinkedIn’s method of storing passwords
was cryptographically insecure.
1.1 The password problem
The problem of storing passwords securely has existed for decades. Storing
passwords in plaintext is clearly insecure, posing an immediate and uncontain-
able risk in the event of a breach. Storing encrypted passwords also poses a
risk due to its two-way nature – anything encrypted can also be decrypted; in
addition, encryption keys are often stored on the same servers as the data being
encrypted, meaning a breach is potentially disastrous.
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Most websites opt for storing hashed passwords. The intent of storing hashed
passwords is to provide a fail-safe to prevent identity theft in the event of a server
breach. The method is intended to provide authentication and secrecy, and to
prevent adversaries from being able to guess the passwords being hashed.
1.2 LinkedIn breach
Like most web services, LinkedIn hashed its passwords. The company passed
user information through a SHA-1 hash function.[6] The original breach, specu-
lated to be through a SQL injection attack, occurred on June 5th 2012, and was
reported by a number of news agencies. LinkedIn confirmed the breach the fol-
lowing day. [17] It was first thought that the breach exposed around 6.5 million
passwords. However, in 2016, the full dump of the hack was posted, exposing
the accounts of over 117 million users, whose information had been compro-
mised but not made public. [5] The severity of the breach was compounded by
improper use of cryptographic hash functions to conceal the password plaintext.
2 Cryptography of Password Hashing
Password hashing works by taking a password input of variable length, and
providing a fixed-length output that seems like a random string. SHA-1, the
specific hash function used by LinkedIn, was published in the 1990s. SHA-1
can encode an up to 264 bit input into a 160 bit message digest.[4] However,
LinkedIn’s implementation of SHA-1 failed to include salts – random numbers
unique to every user – instead simply storing hashed passwords directly to the
server.[8]
SHA-1 works by repeatedly padding the message and breaking it into 512-bit
blocks, then iteratively passing these through a series of logical functions. Fur-
ther information can be found in the official Secure Hash Standard publication
FIPS 180-4.[12]
3 Analysis of Failure
Despite the illusion of secrecy provided by SHA-1, LinkedIn’s method of storing
passwords was dangerously insecure. Using an unsalted hash leaves the system
vulnerable to rainbow table attacks.
3.1 Rainbow tables
Rainbow table attacks assemble a pre-compiled list of passwords into data struc-
tures known as hash chains. The hashes of these passwords have already been
calculated[1]. However, the storage cost for a simple associative array of pass-
words to hashes would be very high. Rainbow tables use reduction functions,
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which map individual hashes back to plaintext passwords. This creates a time-
memory tradeoff, sacrificing time at the cost of memory.[13] By applying al-
ternating sequences of hashes and reduction functions, an attacker can create
chains of hashes and plaintexts:[13]
Pi
Hash(P)
−−−−−→ Ci
Red(C)
−−−−→ Pi+1 · · ·Pn
Figure 1: A schematic of a hash chain
Only the first and last elements in the chain – P0 and Pn – are stored in
memory, thereby greatly reducing the amount of memory required to store a
large number of password - hash pairs. Without a salt, an adversary could ap-
ply the combination of reduction and hashing functions until they reached an
endpoint on a hash chain, then take the corresponding starting plaintext and
follow its hash chain until the target password was found.[13] This vulnerability
is compounded by the fact that poor password choices are often repeated by
multiple users. Security firm KoreLogic’s dump of the most common passwords
exposed in the LinkedIn attack revealed that over 1 million users used the phrase
“123456” as a password.[2]
The introduction of a salt drastically increases the computational cost re-
quired for an effective rainbow table. For example, the password ‘123456’ always
hashes to the same value, meaning there is only one hash chain entry that needs
to be stored for this password. However, if we add a 2-bit salt to the beginning
of the password, we see that the adversary now has 22 more possible values,
extending the length of the hash chains within the rainbow table:
$ hashlib .sha1 (m)
(‘5 a44cf4f2b0f2bfc7da6f386481f6afbc8aff73f’ , ‘01123456 ’)
$ hashlib .sha1 (s + m)
(‘5 a44cf4f2b0f2bfc7da6f386481f6afbc8aff73f’ , ‘01123456 ’)
(‘ ac0e191df76d3714cb4e2c2659d51753775662d6’ , ‘10123456 ’)
(‘3 cf621ead5cc3885a4a5caef840aad7404bdee81’ , ‘11123456 ’)
(‘ b388959b842429b18180899f7b101cf7ed8667db’ , ‘00123456 ’)
A sufficiently large salt (such as 128 bits) would require the adversary to
store or compute 2128 more values for each password, making the cost of such
a rainbow table prohibitively high.
4 Potential Solutions
Of the most common ways to store passwords, LinkedIn chose perhaps the least
secure (aside from storing just plaintexts). Nonetheless, storing passwords in
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a cryptographically secure way remains a difficult task for system administra-
tors, who often resort to using non-cryptographically secure constructions or
hash functions. Principally, cryptographic hash functions should account for
the cost of computing a hashed password, and ensure that cost scales with
faster microprocessors, a requirement that traditional hash functions often do
not satisfy. UNIX’s crypt function was first introduced in 1976, and could
hash approximately four passwords per second on contemporary hardware. By
1999, this had increased to 200,000 crypt operations per second. [16] Using
GPU-driven parallel computing, password crackers were able to compute over
63 billion SHA-1 hashes per second in 2012. [7] This trend underscores a fun-
damental requirement of cryptographic hash functions: they must be resistant
to brute-force attacks.
To accomplish this, a password hashing function must ensure that the com-
putational cost of hashing a password is large enough that an adversary at-
tempting to crack thousands or millions of passwords through brute force will
find the exercise too time-consuming.
4.1 Key Derivation Functions
A key derivation function (KDF) takes a non-random source of input - such as
a password - and derives a cryptographically strong secret key from it. Many
contemporary systems for securing passwords use KDFs rather than standard
hash functions. A secure KDF will output a key that is indistinguishable from a
random string of the same length, and will draw from a uniform distribution of
such strings. Most KDFs are constructed from two modules: one that ”extracts”
a pseudorandom key K from the source input, and one that uses K as the seed
for a pseudorandom function (PRF) to produce several cryptographically secure
pseudorandom keys.[9]
However, a KDF in itself is not a cryptographically secure way to store pass-
words, and may not be resistant to brute-force attacks. A KDF construction
used for password hashing should increase the cost required to compute a pass-
word hash. The implementations discussed here – Bcrypt and scrypt – accom-
plish this through a method known as key stretching. Key stretching involves
using a KDF that requires 2k cryptographic operations per hash computation,
regardless of the length of the password. For example, an n-bit password would
require 2k+n operations under this system. [14]
4.2 Bcrypt
Bcrypt is an adaptive key derivation function, and is perhaps one of the most
widely recommended methods for storing passwords securely. As discussed
above, password hashing functions must be resistant to brute force attacks.
Bcrypt provides this resistance by allowing administrators to specify the num-
ber of internal iterations required for a password hash calculation. This causes
the computational cost of hashing a password, making brute force attacks pro-
hibitively expensive. Bcrypt is based on the Blowfish cipher, a “64-bit block
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cipher structured as a 16-round Feistel network.”[16]
Blowfish(m):[16]
L0 := m[: half ]
R0 := m[half :]
for i = 1 to 16:
Ri := Li−1 ⊕ Pi
Li := Ri−1 ⊕ F (Ri)
R17 := L16 ⊕ P16
L17 := R16 ⊕ P18
return L17||R17
Though reduced round Blowfish does have vulnerabilities, the standard Blow-
fish block cipher has been demonstrated secure. [3] The Bcrypt algorithm uses
the variant Eksblowfish, which takes in the user’s desired cost of computation
as a parameter:
EksBlowfish(cost, salt, key):[16]
state← InitState()
state← ExpandKey(state, salt, key)
repeat 2cost:
state← ExpandKey(state, 0, salt)
state← ExpandKey(state, 0, key)
return state
Bcrypt is designed to remain resistant to brute force attacks regardless of
the speed of modern microprocessors. The ability of Bcrypt to iterate for 2cost
cycles allows administrators to increase the number of iterations to compensate
for stronger password cracking hardware. As the number of iterations increases,
individual password hashes take longer to compute, ensuring that a brute force
attack remains an expensive task for adversaries. [11]
4.3 Scrypt
Scrypt follows a similar paradigm to Bcrypt, using an adaptive cost mechanism
to stymie brute force attackers. However, Bcrypt is still vulnerable to brute force
attacks using parallelized hardware. Improvements in semiconductor technology
allow attackers to embed more circuits at lower cost. [14]
Highly parallelized hardware such as the GPU is well suited to the repetitive
task of password cracking, because the large number of circuits allows even
computationally expensive passwords to be hashed non-sequentially. Billions of
password hashing operations can be performed every second, greatly reducing
the effectiveness of even adaptive KDFs like Bcrypt. [7]
Scrypt provides resistance against parallelized brute force attacks by making
both sides of the time-memory tradeoff costly. It allows the amount of mem-
ory required to hash a password to increase proportionally to the number of
computations.
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MFcrypt(password, salt,N, p, dkLen):[14]
(B0 · · ·Bp−1)← PBKDF2(P, S, 1, p ∗MFLen)
for i = 0 to p− 1:
Bi ←MF (Bi, N)
DK ← PBKDF2PRF (P,B0||B1|| · · · ||Bp−1, 1, dkLen)
The full proof of this algorithm can be found in [14]. Scrypt’s large memory
requirement is partly due to the action of computing and storing in memory
a large number of bit strings using a pseudorandom function. This requires
allocating a large number of memory locations. The amount of memory used
and number of computations required can both be tuned using the parameters
N and p. This allows system administrators to ensure that the cost of hashing
millions of passwords remains very expensive (both in time and in memory),
even with advancements in hardware.
5 Conclusion
The use of cryptographically secure password storage remains critical to infor-
mation security as a whole. Password hashing is a last line of defense, protecting
user data in the event of a breach. The 2012 LinkedIn breach is an excellent
case study in securing stored passwords.
The use of an unsalted hash function led to the exposure of over 100 million
passwords. As we have shown, standard hash functions such as SHA-1 are no
longer adequate for storing passwords, and are vulnerable to both rainbow table
and brute force attacks. Alternatives such as Bcrypt and scrypt use combina-
tions of salts and adaptive computation and memory cost, to make password
cracking more expensive than what a standard unsalted hash function would
allow.
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